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THE CHAIN-STORE PARADOX REVIS ITED 
ABSTRACT. The rationality of predatory practices has been extensively debated among 
economists and lawyers. Selten (1978) considered a fictitious chain-store confronted with 
potential entrances of local competitors. In his formal analysis via an extensive game with 
complete and perfect information predatory behavior is precluded by the unique sequential 
(and perfect) equilibrium. Kreps and Wilson (1982b) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982) 
established in modified models with incomplete information that predation against early 
entrants may be rational since it creates areputation to the effect hat later potential entrants 
are deterred. The present paper offers a modification of Selten's model with complete but 
imperfect information which renders possible reputation and deterrence. 
The rationality of predatory practices has been extensively debated 
among economists and lawyers. Selten (1978) considered a fictitious 
chain-store confronted with potential entrances of local competitors. In
his formal analysis via an extensive game with complete and perfect 
information predatory behavior is precluded by the unique sequential 
(and perfect) equilibrium. Kreps and Wilson (1982b) and Milgrom and 
Roberts (1982) established in modified models with incomplete infor- 
mation that predation against eraly entrants may be rational since it 
creates areputation to the effect hat later potential entrants are deterred. 
The present paper offers a model with complete but imperfect infor- 
mation which renders possible reputation and deterrence. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The conception of "predatory pricing" had a long tradition in economics 
and can in fact be traced back to Adam Smith (1776). Also jurisprudence 
has been concerned with predatory practices for quite a long time as the 
Sherman Anti-Trust Act from 1890 shows distinctly. There is no agree- 
ment in the literature on whether predatory pricing can be maintained as 
a viable threat and whether the anti-trust laws prohibiting predatory 
prices are necessary. The crucial point in this debate is the credibility of 
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threats. It is therefore important o analyze in a purely game theoretic 
context whether effective threatening of potential entrants by a monopo- 
list can be rational. Obviously, this is an abstract problem which may very 
well be treated in a model disregarding many aspects of real markets and 
details of actual pricing policies. Such a model was presented by Selten 
(1978). The plausibility of effective deterrence asserted by Selten is not 
confirmed by the formal game-theoretic analysis of his scenario. This is 
what Selten calls the "Chain-Store Paradox".  Later work by Rosenthal 
(1981), Kreps and Wilson (1982b), and Milgrom and Roberts (1982) falls 
back upon and modifies Selten's model. The same I shall do in the present 
paper. Before decribing Selten's formal model in the next section I shall 
recall Selten's fictitious scenario of a market situation. 
There are 20 towns, in each of which a chain-store, player M for short, 
has exactly one branch. In each of these towns there is one potential 
competitor, player kel l  ..... 201. It is assumed that at 20 consecutive points 
of time each of the 20 players ke[1 ..... 201 has to decide whether he prefers 
to use his capital in a different way. As soon as k has decided, the other 
20 players, M,k '~ l l  . . . . .  201, k' ~e k, are informed about his choice. If k has 
decided not to establish a shop, i.e. not to enter the kth market, nothing 
changes on this market. In this case a reaction or decision o f  p layer M 
is not necessary and, therefore, does not take place. If k has decided to 
enter the kth market hen M has to choose between two alternatives. 
Without going into details of the structure of possible pricing policies, 
it is assumed for the sake of simplicity that these two alternatives are 
described sufficiently well by the adjectives "cooperative" and "aggres- 
sive". Here "cooperative" describes peaceful reaction rather than proper 
cooperation. Also M's decision is immediately made known to all other 
players. Hence, whenever one of the players is to decide he knows the 
complete history. After k's decision ot to enter the market or after M's 
decision in the kth town, player k + 1 has to make his choice (k~[1 ..... 19]). 
It is assumed that all players are profit maximizers. For player M this 
means that he wants to maximize the sum of the profits on all markets. 
Also all players are assumed to be rational in the sense that they are willing 
and able to conclude and compute correctly. As to the players' outcomes 
it is assumed that for M the situation on the kth market is optimal if he 
is a monopolist, i.e. if player k decides not to enter the market. In case 
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of entrance of player k peaceful reaction of Myields him a higher profit 
on this particular market than an aggressive policy. For player ke[1 ..... 201 
it is assumed that entrance followed by peaceful reaction of Mis optimal. 
But renunciation of entrance is more profitable for him than entrance 
followed by a price war. Finally it is assumed that cooperation (in the 
proper sense) is precluded. 
There is a straightforward way to model this scenario as a 20-fold 
repetition of a two-person game in extensive form with complete and 
perfect information. Also the resulting repeated game is an extensive 
game with complete and perfect information. 
Motivating my own modelling of the Chain-Store scenario requires 
knowledge of Selten's original model as well as of the modifications due 
to Kreps and Wilson and to Milgrom and Roberts. Accordingly, I shall 
briefly present and discuss these models in the next two sections. The 
indispensable t chnical tools are collected in the appendix. 
Selten (1978) used for his analysis of the Chain-Store paradox the 
concept of a perfect equilibrium, which he introduced in (1975). Let me 
conclude this section by giving some reasons why I prefer the concept of 
sequential equilibrium, and why I do so in particular for the present 
analysis. 
Not only are "most" sequential equilibria perfect, but sequential 
equilibria have also much nicer mathematical properties and are easier 
traceable (cf. Kreps and Wilson, 1982a). Perfect equilibria re sequential 
equilibria enjoying an additional weak robustness property. For stability 
considerations, however, which are completely out of the scope of the 
present paper, a much stronger robustness with respect to all distortions 
rather than only with respect o one would be desirable. According to 
Kohlberg and Mertens (1982) "Perfectness eems to be essentially equiva- 
lent to sequentiality plus efficiency". But the bad behavior of sequential 
equilibria with respect to dominance as compared with perfect equilibria 
has no impact on the rationality conception reflected by the equilibrium 
notion. Perfect equilibria do not represent aspects of rationality beyond 
the "sequential rationality" embodied inthe concept of sequential equilib- 
rium. Since understanding the Chain-Store paradox depends only on the 
rationality aspects of the prevailing equilibrium concept he use of se- 
quential equilibrium seems to be adequate. 
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2. SELTEN'S  CHAIN-STORE GAME 
The scenario described in the previous ection is modelled by Selten as 
a 20-staged game tree composed of 20 identical two-person games played 
consecutively on the 20 markets. The kth stage game is described by 
Figure 2.1. 
Fig. 2.1. 
The decisions "enter", "stay out", "cooperative" and "aggressive" are 
abbreviated by " in",  "out",  "co",  and"ag",  respectively. Although the 
specific choice of numbers is consistent with customary conceptions as 
to the relative sizes of monopoly and duopoly profits, for each player only 
the ordinal ranking of the outcomes independent of the opponents' 
outcomes are important. 
If M is to make his choice in this game he knows that k chose to enter 
the market. As a rational profit maximizer M therefore will play "co".  
Presuming this behaviour of M it is rational for k to enter the market. 
Indeed, the resulting equilibrium issequential, whereas the other equilib- 
rium, (out, ag) is not. That is, at each node of the game tree (in, co) 
induces an equilibrium on the partial tree originating from this specific 
node, while this is not the case for (out, ag) at node x. A formal definition 
of sequential equilibria is given in the appendix. Selten's analysis of the 
repeated game, the Chain-Store game, results in the assertion that the 
situation is the same as in the one-stage game. The unique sequential 
equilibrium prescribes entrance for all k~I1 .... ,201 and peaceful reaction 
for M. The induction argument is straight. Establishing the sequential 
equilibrium corresponds to finding an optimum in dynamic program- 
ming. The plausible "deterrence solution" is not supported by the analy- 
sis. This is what Selten calls the "Chain-Store Paradox". 
The specific structure of the extensive games where no lacks of infor- 
mation are present, excludes the generation of reputation and keeps the 
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actions on the 20 markets independent. In case of full information and 
rationality there is nothing to be learned. Player M cannot make any 
potential entrant believe that he is a predator, since they know he is not. 
The common knowledge (cf. Auman, 1976; Milgrom, 1981) that cooper- 
ation is the unique sequentially rational reaction to entry and that entry 
is the unique sequentially rational choice, enforces the unique sequential 
equilibrium. This fact led Kreps and Wilson (1982b) and Milgrom and 
Roberts (1982) to modifications of Selten's model in which lacks of 
information are present. 
3. MODIFICATIONS WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 
In this section, modifications of the Chain-Store Game due to Kreps and 
Wilson (1982b) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982) are discussed. I shall 
present simplified versions of their models which suffice to illustrate the 
basic idea of the modifications. I also adapt the payoffs to Selten's 
original setup. 
Starting point for both these papers is the insight hat relaxing of the 
complete information assumption destroys the presence of common 
knowledge and, therefore, leads to a breakdown of the backward in- 
duction employed by Selten. Only in the presence of lacks of information 
learning from experience and, thus, building up of reputation is possible. 
Accordingly, Kreps and Wilson as well as Milgrom and Roberts altered 
Seltens scenario by assuming some doubt on side of the entrants about 
whether their perceived model of the game to be played is correct. Hence 
the entrants can consider the possibility that with a small probability they 
are not correctly informed about the true tree of the one-stage game. 
Either different outcomes for M (Kreps and Wilson, 1982b) or different 
alternatives for M (Milgrom and Roberts, 1982) are considered possible. 
In either approach there is agreement among the entrants on what might 
be the alternative game and on the probability of this alternative game 
being the true one. Also the way how to change subjective probabilities 
as a consequence of certain observations is in both models for all entrants 
the same. It turns out that in both models there are sequential equilibria 
prescribing predation i  the first stages for M and accordingly staying out 
of the market for nearly all potential entrants. The fear of a predatory 
response of M keeps the potential entrants at almost all stages out of the 
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markets. Only close to the end, where peaceful coexistence is more 
profitable than aggression the potential entrants cannot be deterred 
anymore. The fear of most entrants i justified in both models ince there 
exists with positive probability a "strong" monopolist (cf. Figure 3.1 .), 
who earns from predation even in the short run, or an "aggressive" 
monopolist (cf. Figure 3.2.), whose only possible reaction is predation. 
i n~& 
NATURE 
Fig. 3.1. 
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Fig. 3.2. 
In contrast to Selten's model, where all information sets are singeltons 
the beliefs play an important role here. The potential entrants' common 
subjective probability that M is a predator increases with the number of 
stages of the game in which Mresponses aggressively. When this probabil- 
ity becomes large enough for player k he will decide to stay out. If k is 
small enough, i.e. if reputation grows fast enough, then aggression 
increases indeed M's long run profit. Visualizing this fact prevents already 
the first players from entering the markets. Infact there are relations 
between the specification of initial beliefs, the number of stages of the 
game, the exact payoffs for the players, and the rule how beliefs are 
influenced by experience. By distinguishing "plausible" from "implausi- 
ble" beliefs Kreps and Wilson as well as Milgrom and Roberts arrive at 
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certain uniqueness results. Since this is not the point of the present paper 
I shall not discuss it. For me it is important, to what extent results do 
explain the paradox. From both models one can learn that a small lack 
of information about the game to be played suffices to avoid the appear- 
ance of the Chain-Store Paradox. Selten's model is the perhaps unrealistic 
limit case of the models just discussed, where all entrants' error probabili- 
ty degenerates to zero. Indeed, in many (when not in most) situations the 
incomplete information hypothesis eems to be much more realistic. 
Therefore, I think that nobody who wants to model problems of market 
entry should be harassed by the Chain-Store Paradox. Yet, I am not 
satisfied with the solution of the game theoretic paradox via incomplete 
information. If a complete information scenario as described in detail by 
Selten is taken for granted is than the Chain-Store paradox inevitable? 
Stated differently: Is the lack of information about what the opponent 
is going to choose, which is a fundamental characteristic of any game in 
which the prevailing solution concept fails to predict a unique outcome, 
sufficient o enable the construction of reputation via deterrence in a way 
compatible with the unbounded rationality of all players? I shall give an 
affirmative answer to these questions in the next section. This will be done 
by modifying Selten's model in such a way that the result will, as Wilson 
(1983) states it, "illustrate the general principle that reputations.., can be 
used to coordinate selections of equilibria...". 
4. MODIFICATION WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION 
Starting point for my consideration is the observation that the order in 
which players move in an extensive game may be arbitrary. A two-person 
game in normal form, where each player has two strategies, for instance, 
can be modelled in two different ways as an extensive game depending 
on who is the first to move. Accordingly the structure of information sets 
for the two players is different as are the possibilities of expressing beliefs 
formally. Obviously this may have consequences for the analysis in terms 
of sequential equilibria. 
Looking at the one-stage game of Figure 2.1 again it becomes obvious 
that altering the order of moving would create an information set for 
player k which consists of two nodes. This is illustrated in Figure 4.1. 
In this way the concept of beliefs, an important ingredient of sequential 
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equilibrium, becomes available in the new game tree. I claim, that the new 
game is alse a correct model of the decisional problem in Selten "s scenario. 
Clearly, it is not completely correct in every respect. In the original 
scenario player M decides only if and after player k has already entered 
the market. Therefore we have infact reversed time within every one-stage 
game. But time should play a role in the analysis only as far as infor- 
mation is concerned. Here it becomes important to follow von Neumann 
and Morgenstern (1944) who make a difference between anteriority and 
preliminarity of moves. In games with perfect recall (cf. Kuhn, 1953) 
preliminarity, i.e. an "informational before",  implies anteriority, i.e. a 
"before in t ime", but not vice versa. The original set theoretic formali- 
zation of extensive games in chapter II of von Neumann and Morgenstern 
allows distinction of these properties. The more special formalization of 
extensive games by trees creates an asymmetry which sometimes may be 
impeding. 
Let us look at the game in Figure 4.1. For player k there is no change 
of information involved. He has to decide in ignorance of M's decision. 
Hence the decisional problem of k is formalized with a new model as 
adequately as in the original one. 
What about player M?. Unless the very fact of deciding becomes an 
ingredient of the theory (for instance, deciding might be costly), M can 
as well decide before k, since only in case of k's entrance his decision 
becomes effective. Any potential effect on players k' > k will be the same 
as in the original model. 
The equivalence of the two models, the present one and Selten's 
original one, is based on the Sure Thing Principle (cf. Savage, 1954). In 
the new model there are two possible states of the world, " in"  and"  out",  
and M has to choose between "co"  and "ag"  without knowing the true 
state. Whatever his preferences between "co"  and "ag"  in case of " in"  
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is, say (co R ag), he is indifferent between "co"  and "ag"  in case of 
"out" ,  because there is no difference between "co"  and "ag"  in the 
consequences. But then the Sure Thing Principle prescribes (co R ag) 
unconditionally. The irrelevance of state "out"  for M's decision problem 
allows M to make his choice as well before k's decision, anticipating his 
entrance. 
But the employment of the Sure Thing Principle is totally legitimate 
and not new in our context. First of all is the Sure Thing Principle hidden 
in the Neumann-Morgenstern axioms for utility as Malinvaud (1952) has 
pointed out. Moreover, the acceptance of behavior strategies as equiva- 
lent to mixed strategies in games with perfect recall in Selten (1978), Kreps 
and Wilson (1982b), and Milgrom and Roberts (1982) reflects the idea 
that agents decide at each information set independently of their potential 
decisions at different information sets. Again the Sure Thing Principle 
is employed. 
Let us look now for the sequential equilibria in the alternative one-stage 
game. Obviously (in, co) is again a sequential (even perfect) equilibrium 
with belief #k(co)=l ,  #k(ag)=O for player k. But now (out, ag) is a 
sequential equilibrium, too, since I~tc(co)= O,~k(ag) = 1 defines a consis- 
tent belief, based on which "out"  maximizes the expected outcome for 
player k. 
Certainly, the new situation in which (out, ag) is also a sequential 
equilibrium does not make it more plausible as long as the isolated 
one-stage game is considered. The situation changes, however, if one 
considers the 20-fold repeated game. 
Suppose players 1 ..... 7 trust in the infallible logic telling them that the 
rational player M must response peacefully. Assume furthermore that M 
reacts seven times aggressively to entrance, although this seems to be 
irrational. What is then a reasonable choice for player 8? Shall also he 
trust this abstract argument and take the risk to be punished in the same 
way as his predecessors? Or shall he react to his past observations and 
stay out? Assume he chooses to stay out. Then he will be tempted to check 
whether this is consistent with his conviction that M is rational. Now, if 
the deterring effect keeping player 8 out of the market lasts until player 
16 has to decide, then the predatory strategy has yielded M the total 
outcome of 9.5 = 45. But this exceeds the total profit of permant peacefull 
reaction to entrance, which is only 20.2--40 Hence player 8's 
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to stay out is rational, as is M's behaviour. Yet, in equilibrium it is already 
for players 1 to 7 better to stay out. In the new model a doubt whether 
M will react peacefully does not imply automatically a doubt that M is 
rational. 
Clearly, the more stages the repeated game has the more time is 
available for building up reputation. Hence plausibility grows with the 
number of stages. A formal proof that such an equilibrium is indeed a 
sequential one is straightforward. 
M 4 7 7 7 10 1 7 10 5 - 
ir~ L :~i n~ ~oi~ }nin~ }o ut[~ tin~ ~ut~ n 
,_k__/ . . . . .  _L Z_, \ / 
M~ ~ " -  
M 
Fig. 4.2. 
In Figure 4.2. a two-staged version of the modified Chain-Store game is 
pictured. It is not surprising that due to the few stages the illustrated 
sequential equilibrium which prescribes predation is not very plausible. 
The strategies and beliefs for the players in this example are as follows: 
M play "ag"  in the first stage; make in the second stage the same 
choice as in the first stage. 
1 stay out; ~/I(X1)~--~O, ]./I(X2) = 1 
2 stay out, when M played "ag"  in the first stage, enter other- 
wise; //2(zi)=0, ie[2,3,4,5,71, ]-/2(zi)= 1, iei1,6,8] 
Let us consider the game tree of Figure 4.2. If Player 1 stays out Player 
2 does not know whether M decides to response peacefully or aggressively 
to entrance on the first stage. Hence Player 2's information set consists 
of 4 nodes in this case, namely z3,z4,zs,z6. In this model player M knows, 
however, at the second stage, what he decided in the first stage, even if 
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Player 1 did not enter. As a consequence the unique point corresponding 
to "out"  in the original game is split up now into two points which can 
be distinguished by M. I f  we build a new information set for M consisting 
of the points Ya,Y3, as illustrated by the dotted line in Figure 4.2., then 
Mis in the same informational situation at Stage 2 as he was in the original 
game. However, then the new game is not anymore a game with perfect 
recall, since M forgot his choice at the first stage before his move at the 
second stage. Although both versions allow for building up reputation, 
there are different sets of events with respect o which conditioning is 
possible. In Selten's model the monopolist cannot make decisions at a 
certain stage which are dependent on his own decision at a specific earlier 
stage unless there was entrance at this stage. Only in the case of entrance 
there was a decision which can be remembered at later stages and 
therefore be taken into consideration. In our present model M has plans 
for every earlier stage in his drawer even if these plans have never been 
used. There is a fundamental difference in how past decisions can 
influence present or future decisions. Certainly, also in Selten's model M 
can make a plan in which the decision at later stages depend on former 
decisions. The difference between the models as far as consideration of 
past decisions is concerned is the following. In Selten's model M's  
decision at Stage 7 may depend on his own decision at Stage 6. I f  this 
latter one is a random choice then the move at Stage 7 can only depend 
on the probability distribution prescribed at Stage 6 by M's  behaviour 
strategy. It cannot depend, however, on the specific outcome of the 
random experiment performed at Stage 6, which is prescribed by this 
probability distribution. Yet, this dependence on the specific outcome is 
possible in the present alternative model. Here M can make his decisions 
at all stages dependent on what really happened in the past, i.e. there are 
much more potential conditioning events for later decisions. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The Chain-Store Paradox led Selten (1978) to the conclusion that the 
unbounded rationality approach of game theory which failed to support 
the plausible outcome, should be abandoned in favor of a bounded 
rationality approach. 
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Kreps and Wilson (1982b) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982) showed 
that a slight modification of Selten's cenario can be modelled in such 
a way that the Chain-Store Paradox is avoided. 
In the present paper it is shown that it is not even necessary to change 
the original scenario to avoid the paradox. One has only to choose a 
suitable one among some equivalent models. 
Let me note in passing that also the one-stage game in Figure 5.1. is 
equivalent to Selten's original one. 
Fig. 5.1. 
It is equally suitable for avoiding the paradox. However, intuitively the 
model presented in Section 4 seems more appealing since it is more 
adequate to have the entrants formally endowed with beliefs rather than 
the monopolist. 
I intentionally did not present an explicit learning model which realizes 
reputation building and deterrence. It could easily be established similar 
to those in Kreps and Wilson (1982b) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982). 
Like these it would be quite plausible but still adhoc. My point that 
reputation building and deterrence is possible also in Selten's original 
scenario by alternative modelling is, so I hope, clear enough. 
Let me compare my alternative model with the incomplete information 
models sketched in Section 3. An obvious drawback in those models is 
that, as Kreps and Wilson (1982b, p. 276) write, "by clearly choosing the 
nature of that small uncertainty (pricesely - its support), one can get out 
of a game-theoretical analysis whatever one whishes." A good example 
for this claim is provided by Kreps et al. (1982), a proof for a correspond- 
ing theorem isgiven by Maskin and Fudenberg (1983). 1The situation is, 
however, totally different in my complete information model. Here 
reputation can help only to select from different sequential equilibria. The 
only uncertainty concerns which of several possible quilibrium strategies 
other players chose. There is no uncertainty about he game which is to 
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be played. One can take the basic data of the game for granted and still 
get reputation. And here we are in contradiction to the prevailing view 
that common knowledge precludes building up of reputation. Milgrom 
and Roberts (1982) claim that "informational asymmetries.., will be 
necessary for reputation building to occur in general..." And Dixit (1982) 
writes: "For  reputation to have a role, therefore, we need either infinite 
(or indefinite) repetition, or incomplete information." 
There is certainly common knowledge about the game in my model and 
hence there are no informational asymmetries. Also there is complete 
information. Yet, reputation has a role there. However, if one extends 
the common knowledge or informational asymmetry requirements to 
what players know about other player's choices then common knowledge 
requires uniqueness of  sequential equilibrium in a game with complete 
and perfect information. Selten's original game is an example. Clearly, 
reputation building is impossible in such a case. 
I would like to emphasize at this point that the equilibrium (in, co) 
remains the unique perfect equilibrium also in my model. The rationality 
properties of perfect equilibria are compatible with building reputation 
in Selten's cenario. The robustness property is not. This confirms a point 
made by Kreps and Wildon (1982a) who state: "The power of reputation 
seems to be positively related to its fragility." 
The previous paragraph is not to be interpreted as if perfect equilibria 
exclude reputation building. Also here non-uniqueness is the key. What- 
ever equilibrium or solution concept is used non-uniqueness opens the 
door for reputation. 
In Selten's original model there is a unique sequential equilibrium. The 
term "Chain-Store Paradox" expresses the fact that in this model there 
is an overdetermination via the employed concept of sequential equilib- 
rium since plausible outcomes are ruled out. In my alternative model there 
is abundance of sequential equilibria which may be critizised as an 
underdetermination, si ce many implausible outcomes are not ruled out. 
The same holds true for the incomplete information approach. Kreps and 
Wilson (1982b) as well as Milgrom and Roberts (1982) seem to consider 
restriction to certain "plausible" equilibria a remedy. In fact by these 
means they get uniqueness on the equilibrium path. My point of view is 
somewhat different. I consider the multiplicity of equilibria n advantage 
rather than a drawback. It restricts the set of rational outcomes without 
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determining this set as a singleton. Several people may differ not only in 
tastes but also in other characteristics which are involved in learning 
processes. Not all people are impressed inthe same way by the same event. 
Credulity, optimism, scepticism, obstinacy may influence the building of 
beliefs dependent on events. This may lead to very different equilibrium 
outcomes all of which are based on rational behaviour of the players. 
Somebody's belief that doomsday is tomorrow may be considered 
implausible by others but if he behaves accordingly he may do in a 
completely rational way. I think uniqueness of social equilibria is a 
fiction. I interpret equilibrium concepts as advices precluding non- 
rational non-equilibrium behavior rather than as concrete devices how to 
choose. Further estriction of the set of sequential equilibria should not 
be accomplished in my opinion by ad hoc postulates. Rather I would like 
further restriction via a theory which explicitly explains learning pro- 
cesses. I feel that the concept of sequential equilibrium provides an 
appropriate game theoretic a priori restriction to rational outcomes. 
It would be interesting to see what kind of outcomes would appear if 
the Chain-Store game is played in experiments. In particular it would be 
informative to see whether results differ according to whether players are 
confronted with Selten's game or with my modification. If they would 
differ then such game experiments would cast additional doubts on the 
justification of independence axioms representing the Sure Thing prin- 
ciple. 
A further very interesting question arising from the above conside- 
rations is, how information patterns influence sequential equilibrium 
analysis. Equivalence of information patterns has been analyzed by 
Dalkey (1953). It would be interesting to have a notion of equivalence of
games under sequential equilibrium analysis. One can criticize the prevail- 
ing equilibrium concepts because of their sensitivity with respect o 
(seemingly) inessential modifications of the game tree (cf. Kohlberg and 
Mertens, 1982). One can, however, criticize the modelling of extensive 
games. It would be desirable to have a canonical way of representing an 
extensive game in which simultaneous moves are possible and where 
preliminarity is modelled in a natural way not based on anteriority. This 
might require to go back to von Neumann's and Morgenstern's set 
theoretic modelling of extensive games. 
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6. APPENDIX 
I assume that the notion of extensive game and its representation as a tree 
are known. For definitions ee Kuhn (1952), Luce and Raiffa (1976), and 
Selten (1975). Throughout the paper only games with perfect recall are 
considered, i.e. games in which every player does not forget anything he 
knew at former stages of the game. 
A game F is a game with perfect recall if the following holds true: 
Consider any two nodes x,y of the game tree being in the same infor- 
mation set of a certain player. If two paths start at x and y by different 
moves, then any subsequent information set of that player can be met by 
at most one of these two paths. 
A pure strategy of a player is a specification of choice at each of the 
players information sets. A mixed strategy of a player is a probability 
distribution on the set of his pure strategies. A behavior strategy for a 
player is an assignment of a probability distribution over the possible 
choices at each of the players information sets. Kuhn (1953) has shown 
that any outcome which is possible via mixed strategies in a game with 
perfect recall can as well be realized via behavior strategies. 
A (Nash-)equilibrium of an n-person game F with perfect recall is a 
combination of behavior strategies of all players, each of which is a best 
response to the whole of the others. "Best" means yielding the highest 
expected payoff. 
A system of beliefs assigns to each of every player's information sets 
a probability distribution on this set. An assessment is a pair (b,/a), where 
/a is a system of beliefs and b a combination of behavior strategies for 
the n players. If b has the property that all nodes in all information sets 
have positive probability, i.e. if b is completely mixed, then it defines on 
each information set a conditional probability given this information set. 
In this way b generates a specific system of beliefs,/t(b). An assessment 
(b, ff) is consistent if there is a sequence of completely mixed combinations 
of behaviour strategies, bn, converging (pointwise) to b, such that/t(b,)  
converges (pointwise) to g. A combination of behavior strategies, b, is 
a sequential best response to the assessment (b,#) if b defines for every 
player at any of his information sets a best response to (b,/a). Again 
"best"  means maximizing the expected payoff with respect o 6 and #. 
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A consistent assessment (b,#) for which b is a sequential best response 
to (b,#) is a sequential equilibrium. A combination ofbehavior strategies 
b is also called sequential equilibrium, if there exists a system of beliefs, 
#, such that (b,~t) is a sequential equilibrium. 
A sequential equilibrium b is aperfect equilibrium if there is a sequence 
of completely mixed combinations ofbehavior strategies, bn, converging 
to b such that b is a sequential best response to (bn, I-t(bn)) for all n. 
In a sequential equilibrium no player has a reason to regret his choice 
whenever he has to move, even off the equilibrium path. A sequential 
equilibrium prescribes optimal choices even at points never arrived at if 
the prescription is followed by all players. Tracing a sequential equilib- 
rium amounts to applying Bellman's optimality principle and can be done 
by dynamic programming. The beliefs are consistent via Bayes rule with 
eachother and with the equilibrium combination of behavior strategies 
whenever Bayes rule can be applied. 
A perfect equilibrium is a sequential equilibrium, which even if all 
players modify slightly their equilibrium strategies in a suitable specified 
way, for every player emains a best response to the modified strategies 
of the others. 
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NOTE 
A natural step then is to leave the game-theoretic context and to treat he problem "like 
one-player decision problem" (Rosenthal, 1981, p. 92). 
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